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ANARCHY REIGNS SUPREME
MICHAEL M BERGER*
INTRODUCTION
As W.C. Fields once noted, there comes a time when one must grasp
the bull by the tail and face the situation.
Disregarding that practical advice, the United States Supreme
Court-for the third time in five years-has found a way to not decide
whether the constitutional just compensation guarantee requires gov-
ernment agencies to compensate property owners when regulations un-
reasonably restrict the use of private property.'
Williamson County Regional Planning Commn. v. Hamilton Bank2
takes its place in the pantheon of indecision, alongside Agins v. City of
Tiburon3 and San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego,4 as dem-
onstrating that those learned in the ways of the law can always find a
* J D. 1967, Washington University; LL.M. 1968, University of Southern
California, Member, California, Missouri, and United States Supreme Court Bars. The
author is a member of the Santa Monica, California law firm of Fadem, Berger &
Norton. Agreeing with Justice Douglas that the reader should know through what
spectacles his advisor is viewing the problem, and that private practitioners who may
have "axes to grind" should so note when they enter the scholarly lists, the author notes
that his practice consists of representing property owners in real property litigation. See
Douglas, Law Reviews and Full Disclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227, 228-230 (1965). A
large portion of that litigation is against government agencies and an increasing amount
of it deals with the consequences of excessive land use regulation.
I. The fifth amendment just compensation clause was incorporated long ago into
the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, thus extending it to state and
local government agencies. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897)
2 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
3 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
4 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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way to duck an issue. With all due respect, the Hamilton Bank non-
decision is both bad law and bad government.
The issue before the Court was one of immediate importance to gov-
ernment agencies and to those who deal with them. The combined
impact of heightened environmental concern, increasing need to pre-
serve open space, and tight municipal budgets has led local government
agencies to employ their best efforts to find ways to increase or preserve
open space without buying property.5
Thus, severe restrictions of land use have become an increasingly
used tool of local government.6 Nonetheless, governmental agencies
enacting stringent land use restrictions, "environmental" groups urg-
ing such restrictions, and property owners feeling they are being com-
pelled to give their land to the public, are living in a state of legal
chaos. In effect, the parties have been playing a massive legal game of
Russian roulette. "Environmentalists" have been urging radical re-
strictions on the right to use property, government agencies often have
enacted such restrictions, and property owners have challenged these
restrictions in court.
No one really knows the legal consequence of regulatory stultifica-
tion. Government agencies have been pulling the trigger without
knowing what ammunition, if any, is in the chambers. The possibilities
range from no remedy to the following:
" invalidation of the regulation;
* invalidation of the regulation plus compensation for a tempo-
rary taking for the time the regulation was in effect; and
* compensation for a complete taking of the property.
Each possibility has its adherents. Hamilton Bank was capable of pro-
viding guidance so that this remedy issue, which has absorbed the in-
tense attention of both courts and commentators,7 might at last be
5. See 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, § 158.12 at 411 (1985).
Such mental gymnastics are usually termed "innovative" by their supporters. See, e.g.,
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377-78 (1979); Cun-
ningham, Introduction to Symposium: Constitutional Issues in Land Use Regulation, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449, 450 (1981); Freedman, Innovative Land Use Controls:
Will the Petaluma Decision Limit Growth?, 50 L.A. BAR BULL. 252 (1975); Comment,
"Fair" is Fair: Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 741, 743 (1982).
6. See, eg., Bosselman & Bonder, Potential Immunity of Land Use Control Systems
From Civil Rights and Antitrust Liability, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 453, 454 (1981).
7. A complete bibliography is far beyond the scope of this article. Some of the more
noteworthy scholarly contributions are: B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTrrUTION (1977); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
(1973); D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
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resolved.
Land use issues are at least as important as any other issue before the
Supreme Court, and land use decisions affect all of us in varying de-
grees. Whether one is a property owner who feels aggrieved by regula-
tory action, an "environmentalist"' who feels that all vacant land
should remain that way,9 a citizen whose taxes either support the liti-
gational efforts of regulating entities or pay judgments entered against
them, or one who pays for the increased cost of housing caused by
excessive regulation,"0 we are all affected. We need guidance. No one
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978); C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER,
VESTED RIGHTS: BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS
(1982); Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment:
Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15
(1983); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1976); Kan-
ner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, INSTITUTE ON PLAN-
NING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 177 (1980); Mandelker, Land Use Takings:
The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights,
81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Sax, Takings and The Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964);
Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057
(1980); Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Con-
demnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Waite, Government Power and Private
Property, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 283 (1967). The autor's own earlier views may be seen in
Berger, The State's Police Power is not (Yet) the Power of a Police State, 35 LAND USE L.
& ZON.DIG. No. 5 at 4 (1983); Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate-Is That the
Question? Reflections on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and
Private Property Rights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. (1975).
8. Opponents to development generally wrap their opposition in the robes of envi-
ronmental protection, even though their actual motives are sometimes less lofty. As
Professor Frieden stated:
By far the most frequent objections that growth opponents raise have to do with
environmental impacts. These range from harm to wildlife to destruction of natu-
ral resources to increases in air pollution. Yet to label all protest as environmental-
ism would be a mistake. Many growth opponents use environmental arguments to
mask other motives, such as fears of property tax increases or anxieties about keep-
ing their community exclusive. Environmental rhetoric has become a valued cur-
rency for public debate, with much greater voter appeal than arguments that
appear more narrowly self-interested. As a result, people who are not environmen-
talists in any sense often borrow it for their own purposes.
FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 8 (1979). See also Hagman,
An Environmental Masquerade, Los Angeles Times, June 14, 1981, at 25, pt. 8; Tucker,
Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, Harpers, Dec. 1977, at 49.
9. Some "environmentalists" have been described as those who already own their
homes in the mountains.
10. See Report of the President's Commission on Housing 177-83 (1982); Pulliam,
19851
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is served by the Supreme Court's repeated refusal to provide that
guidance.
SUMMARY OF THE HAMILTON BANK FACTS
No purpose would be served by an excessively detailed statement of
facts. The trial lasted fifteen days, resulting in more than two thousand
pages of testimony by twenty-seven witnesses. A short summary will
suffice to set the stage.
The story began in 1973 when the owner of 676 acres of vacant land
in Williamson County, Tennessee, sought permission to develop a resi-
dential subdivision. Because of the hilly nature of the property, the
owner proposed a "clustered" development, rather than a standard
subdivision. In other words, instead of having lots of uniform size and
shape, the owner wanted to group the homes together in clusters, thus
leaving large areas of open space. In that way, the same number of
homes would be built but, instead of each home having its own little
piece of open space, the open space would be collected in common ar-
eas.11 Of the 676 acres, 260 acres were to be open space, most of that
in a golf course. To ensure that the open space would remain open, the
county was given an open space easement in virtually all of the prop-
erty, including the golf course, except the buildable lots.
The county approved the preliminary plat for 736 homes. When the
plat was approved, it was known that it would take a decade or more to
complete the development. Because of local limitations on the length
of time a preliminary plat may continue to exist before final completion
of the project, the preliminary plat was reapproved four times between
1973 and 1979.2 During that time the owner spent three million dol-
Brandeis Brief for Decontrol of Land Use: A Plea for Constitutional Reform, 13 Sw.
U.L. REV. 435 (1983).
11. For discussions of cluster developments, see 4 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING, 71-43 (Supp. 1984); 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW § 47.01 at 212-13 (1974).
12. Such artificial time limits demonstrate some of the game-playing that occurs in
land use planning. Many planners, politicians and academicians have wrung their
bands for years, pleading for "good" planning which thoughtfully utilizes large areas of
land. See, e.g., P. BLAKE, GOD'S OWN JUNKYARD (1964); E. EICHLER & M. KAPLAN,
THE COMMUNITY BUILDERS (1967); P. GOODMAN & P. GOODMAN, COMMUNITAS
(1947); W. SCHNEIDER, BABYLON IS EVERYWHERE (English Translation 1963). Yet
the politicians continue to provide a framework in which such sensitivity becomes im-
possible. This case is a paradigm. The project was so substantial that everyone knew it
would take more than a decade to complete properly. But the state's planning law
required the preliminary plat to be replaced by a final plat, that is, the project must be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/3
HAMILTON BANK
lars building the golf course and another half million dollars construct-
ing water and sewer facilities. By 1980 212 homes had been
constructed.
After the 1973 approval, the county passed additional, more strin-
gent regulations. Nonetheless, up until 1979 each plat reapproval was
based on the 1973 regulations, this being pursuant to county policy not
to change rules in mid-project and to a grandfather clause in the new
regulations which provided that plats approved earlier had a right to
continue under the earlier regulations. There was also formal action by
the county's legislative body exempting this project from post-1973
regulations.
All of that changed in 1979. The Planning Commission reversed its
course and decided the plat thereafter would need to be evaluated by
current regulations. This meant that, because of more restrictive den-
sity regulations passed after 1973, fewer homes could be built.
Through formal administrative proceedings, the owner sought a return
to the original understanding. The Planning Commission, however, re-
fused to alter its stance. Thus, in 1980, the owner lost the undeveloped
portion of the property, about 260 acres, through foreclosure, 13 and
Hamilton Bank became the owner of the undeveloped acreage.
Hamilton Bank was equally unsuccessful in changing the Planning
Commission's mind, and the plat was disapproved again. Hamilton
ready for construction within one year or the preliminary plat would lapse. There was
no way a final plat for this entire project rationally could have been completed within
one year. See generally C. SIEMON, W. LARSON & D. PORTER, supra note 7; Cunning-
ham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel and the Land Development Process, 29 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 625 (1978); Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of Multi-Land Use
Permits, 11 Sw. U. L. REV. 545 (1979); Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal
Development Vis A Vis the Abortions of Public Whimsy, 7 ENV. L. 519 (1977).
If planners and politicians are serious, then the laws must permit sufficient time for
design and development within a stable legal and regulatory framework.
13. A distressing, yet increasingly familiar pattern has developed wherein property
is lost through foreclosure when planning delays disrupt the normal flow of funds. See,
e.g., Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1978);
Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta County Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 290, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 91 (1978); Orsetti v. Fremont, 80 Cal. App. 3d 961, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1978);
Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); cf County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal. 3d 201, 161
Cal. Rptr. 742, 605 P.2d 381 (1980); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 104
Cal. Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 (1972). See also Note, Inverse Condemnation: Valuation of
Compensation in Land Use Regulatory Cases, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 621, 625 n.15
(1983).
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Bank filed suit under the Civil Rights Act 4 alleging that the property
had been taken without providing either due process of law or just
compensation.
At trial there was expert disagreement over the number of homes
that could be built on the 260 acres under the new regulations. The
number remaining to be built pursuant to the original approval was
476.15 The jury concluded that the new regulations would permit con-
struction of only sixty-seven more homes.' 6 The jury also concluded
that the county was estopped to require compliance with post-1973
regulations and that $350,000 in damages were due for the temporary
taking of the property while later regulations were enforced.' 7
The district judge vacated the damages on the theory that a tempo-
rary deprivation could not require constitutional compensation, but the
court of appeals, by a two to one vote, reinstated them, 8 thus setting
the stage for the main event in Washington.
THE CHAOTIC STATE OF THE LAW
Before proceeding to the Court's analysis of the facts in Hamilton
Bank, it is important that one have a proper feel for the state of the law
leading up to this decision. Two decades ago, Professor Sax concluded
that this area of law's predominant characteristic was its array of con-
fusing and apparently incompatible results.1 9 The passage of time has
only made the situation worse. Five years ago, just before the first
Supreme Court refusal to decide the issue, Professor Kanner concluded
that "[a] survey of the state law on this topic reveals an amorphous and
irreconcilable body of decisions, each purporting to implement the con-
stitutional protection against confiscation." 20
A sampling of various states' laws in the area illustrates Professor
Kanner's conclusion. California,2 Arizona, 22 and apparently Flor-
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
15. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3115 n.5.
16. Id. at 3115-16.
17. Id. at 3116.
18. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d
402 (6th Cir. 1984).
19. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964).
20. Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, INST. ON
PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 177, 180 (1980).
21. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 277, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 378, 598 P.2d
25, 31 (1979), afl'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Aptos Seascape Corp. v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/3
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ida,23 reject compensation as a remedy. They opt instead for invalida-
tion as the only solution.24  By contrast, Ohio,25  Georgia,26
Massachusetts, 27 and Rhode Island 28 reject invalidation, holding that
compensation is the sole remedy. Other states have created a spectrum
of remedial decision.29 Six states, Colorado, Kansas, North Dakota,
Oregon, Texas, and Washington, have announced that either compen-
sation or invalidation may be appropriate, depending on the circum-
stances.3 ° New York seems in a world of its own, which is not even
internally consistent. It purports to hold that invalidation is the only
remedy, unless there has been physical invasion or direct legal control
of the property, or where the injury suffered is irreversible.31 Yet New
York steadfastly has refused to compensate even for physical inva-
sion 32 or irreversible injury.33  At the same time, New York has
County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 493, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 195 (1982),
appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983).
22. Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979).
23. Dade County v. Nat'l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984); Grady v.
Lee County, 458 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). But see Albrecht v. State, 444
So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1984); Key Haven Assoc. Enter., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 427 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 1982).
24. Hawaii may also be in this camp. See Allen v. Honolulu, 58 Hawaii 432, 571 P.
2d 328 (1977) (reversing an award of damages for development costs lost after property
was down-zoned).
25. Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E. 2d 658,
cert. den. sub nom. Chongris v. Corrigan, 409 U.S. 919 (1972).
26. Clifton v. Berry, 244 Ga. 78, 259 S.E. 2d 35 (Ga. 1979).
27. Hamilton v. Conservation Comm'n, 12 Mass. App. 359, 425 N.E. 2d 358 (Ct.
App. 1981).
28. Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, (R.I. 1981).
29. See Kanner, supra note 20, at 206-09.
30. Hermanson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 42 Colo. App. 154, 595 P.2d 694 (1979);
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 255 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979); Kraft v.
Malone, 313 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1981); Seuss Builders v. Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 656
P.2d 306 (1983); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W. 2d 389 (Tex. 1978); Brazil v. City
of Auburn, 93 Wash. 2d 484, 610 P.2d 909 (1980). Minnesota has announced a prefer-
ence for injunctive relief, but will permit damages where the injury is permanent or the
regulation is enacted solely to protect a government project, for example, airport ap-
proach zoning. See McShane v. City of Fairbault, 292 N.W. 2d 253 (Minn. 1980).
31. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5,
350 N.E. 2d 381, cert denied and appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
32. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 53 N.Y. 2d 124, 440 N.Y.S.
2d 843, 423 N.E. 2d 320 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); New York Tel. Co. v. North
Hempstead, 41 N.Y. 2d 691, 395 N.Y.S. 2d 143, 363 N.E. 2d 694 (1977).
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awarded damages for a temporary de facto taking effected by use-stulti-
fying regulations.3
4
All state constitutions prohibit the taking of private property for
public use without the payment of just compensation, as does the
United States Constitution.35 Therefore, whether state courts purport
to interpret state or federal constitutional provisions, the result should
be the same. This makes the varying treatment between the states even
more mystifying. Because they are applying identical constitutional
precepts, the constitutional protection accorded citizens should not de-
pend on the state in which they happen to live. There is a need for
uniform legal treatment.36
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to provide guidance in this
field. Not since Justice Stewart candidly confessed his inability to de-
fine pornography, 37 has the Court so tiptoed around an issue. The
Court repeatedly has refused even to define what a "taking" is, prefer-
ring to decide the issue on an ". . ad hoc, factual . . ." basis.
38
The Supreme Court has not, however, been silent. The conceptual
problem is that the Court's discussions have become so oracular over
the years that they merely provide grist for scholarly disputation, and
excuses for state and lower federal courts to do as they please.
39
33. Charles v. Diamond, 41 N.Y. 2d 318, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 594, 360 N.E. 2d 1295
(1977).
34. Keystone Assoc. v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 620, 371 N.Y.S. 2d 814 (Ct. Cl. 1975),
rev'd, 55 App. Div. 2d 85, 389 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (1976), rev'd and remanded, 45 N.Y. 2d
894, 411 N.Y.S. 2d 8, 383 N.E. 2d 560 (1978).
35. See 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.01[3] (rev. 3d ed.
1983).
36. One would have presumed the issue settled no later than Appomottox. Cf.
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1947); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. R.
Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).
37. Justice Stewart's confession came with the now famous avowal that "... I know
it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
At least when Justice Stewart made this confession, the Court was deciding a large
number of cases on the issue, giving observers a pattern by which decisions could be
made. Land use law lacks enough Supreme Court decisions to disclose such a pattern.
38. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2878 (1984); Kaiser Aetna
v. U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
39. This could, at one time, have been viewed as an illustration of the Supreme
Court's preference for permitting thorough lower court disputation in search of consen-
sus or, at least, the airing of all possible views. See generally, R. STERN & E. GRESS-
MAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 269 n.32 (5th ed. 1978); Schaeffer, Reducing Circuit
Conflicts, 69 A.B.A.J. 452, 454 (1982). The situation now, however, approaches abdica-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/3
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One prominent line of cases, generally ignored by those who advo-
cate the position of regulatory agencies, builds on the hornbook propo-
sition that, when examining a legislative enactment for
constitutionality, the courts seek a construction that will render the
enactment constitutional, rather than void.' The courts traditionally
deal with construction of legislation that would be unconstitutional
without providing compensation by simply construing the legislation as
requiring compensation. Such a construction permits them to uphold,
rather than invalidate, the legislation.
Hurley v. Kincaid,'" provides an example. In Hurley, the Supreme
Court reversed an injunction against a threatened uncompensated tak-
ing of land. The Court's rationale combined the constitutional prefer-
ence for upholding legislation with traditional precepts of equity
jurisprudence.42 According to the Court, the only infirmity in the gov-
ernment's plan was its failure to compensate. Compensation, however,
may be obtained through an inverse condemnation action.43 Because
there was an adequate legal remedy through inverse condemnation,
and the legislation would be upheld if a provision for compensation
could be inferred, injunctive relief, that is, invalidation, was not
available."
tion of the duty to decide cases. See Kanner, Comment, 33 LAND USE LAW & ZONING
DIG. No. 5 (1981). There will be no consensus. Competing views have been aired.
There is a clear conflict among the federal courts of appeals on what constitutional law
requires. The states are irreconcilably split. It is time for a definitive answer. Id. at 8.
40. E.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).
41. 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
42. Id. The Supreme Court repeatedly has linked concepts of equity and fairness to
its interpretation of the constitutional just compensation guarantee. E.g., Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); United States v. Fuller, 409
U.S. 488, 490 (1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 631
(1961); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
43. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Hamilton Bank, the Constitution does not
require compensation before the taking as long as there is some way to obtain compen-
sation thereafter. 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
44. Hamilton Bank cited Hurley with approval. 105 S. Ct. at 3121. See also Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981); San Diego Gas & Elec, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lake
Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1979); Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S.
725 (1950). See generally Kanner, supra note 20, at 197-206.
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In 1984 the Supreme Court reconsidered, and reconfirmed this line
of cases, flatly concluding that a property owner cannot seek equitable
relief to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use
when the taking is duly authorized by law and the owner could bring
suit for compensation against the sovereign after the taking.45
Other cases have approved severe restrictions on the right to use
property without requiring compensation. 46 While at least some of
these cases may be explained by the theory that government regulation
prevented the owner from inflicting harm on other persons, 47 addi-
tional cases fall outside the theory's parameters. This theory also fails
to deal with the occasionally panoramic language about the need for
regulation.48 Still other cases have said that even a valid regulation
may so far impinge on property rights that compensation is constitu-
tionally compelled.49
In its confusion over defining a taking, the Supreme Court has re-
treated recently to the standard "bundle of sticks" analogy used by
generations of real property professors. Likening property ownership
to a bundle of sticks, the Court has concluded that either taking one
stick from the bundle50 or taking a small slice of all sticks in the bun-
dle5" can constitute a taking. But how big is a "stick?" The Court
recently held that a regulation prohibiting the sale of eagle feathers
took only a "strand" from the bundle, and thus was not a taking.52
Where is the line drawn between "strand" and "stick?" And how large
must a "slice" be before its taking requires compensation? In one re-
cent case, the Court noted that, "the constitutional protection afforded
45. Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. 2862.
46. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915).
47. See, e.g., Berger, To Regulate or Not to Regulate-Is That the Question? Reflec-
tions on the Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property
Rights, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 253, 275-79 (1975).
48. Eg., Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 386-87, 394-95; Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at
410.
49. E.g., United States v. Security Industrial Park, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982); Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979).
50. Ruckelshaus, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2878; Kaiser Aetna v. U.S. 444 U.S. 164, 179-80.
51. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
52. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
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to private property cannot depend solely on size."5 3 Whether some-
thing is a taking cannot be determined merely by whether the volume
of space it occupies is "bigger than a breadbox."54
The second recent case in which the Supreme Court failed to resolve
the remedy issue was San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego.5"
San Diego Gas' importance in the realm of land use is the Court's 4-1-4
split. Justice Blackmun's lead opinion said that the California judg-
ment was not "final" for purposes of United States Supreme Court re-
view and declined to reach the merits. 6 Justice Brennan's dissent,
which also had four adherents, concluded that the judgment denying
compensation was not only final, it was wrong.5 7 What accentuates the
case's impact is Justice Rehnquist's "swing" vote. Justice Rehnquist's
concurring opinion gave Justice Blackmun's view a majority, but tanta-
lizingly he noted that if the appeal was from a "final judgment or de-
cree" of the California Court of Appeal, he would agree with much of
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.5" Even Justice Blackmun did not
disagree with Justice Brennan's analysis of the merits. He noted that
".. . the federal constitutional aspects of that issue are not to be cast
aside lightly."59 Thus, while no formal holding gathered a majority, it
seemed possible that a message was being sent by a majority of the
Court.' The message was summed up succintly by Justice Brennan's
pithy observation: ". . . if a policeman must know the Constitution,
then why not a planner?"6 1
Justice Brennan's dissent dealt harshly with California's analysis,
concluding that its rule that an arbitrary or excessive use of the police
power can never constitute a taking was flatly contrary to prior United
53. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
54. Id. at 438 n.16. Cf. United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 76 (1982)
(bundle owned by lienholder may be smaller than bundle owned by fee owner, but tak-
ing of even a small bundle without compensation violates fifth amendment).
55. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621.
56. Id. at 633.
57. Id. at 636.
58. Id. at 633-34.
59. Id. at 633.
60. Compare, Freilich, Solving the Taking Equation: Making the Whole Equal the
Sum of the Parts, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, EMINENT DOMAIN 403, 411 (1982), in
which a prominent proponent of uncompensated regulation apparently argues that law-
yers and judges ought not be permitted to add four dissenters to one Rehnquist to come
up with a majority of five.
61. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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States Supreme Court decisions. 62 In determining the requisites for a
taking, Justice Brennan hewed to reality, avoiding the siren song of
those who call for some explicit litmus test like actual physical posses-
sion. He noted the "essential similarity" between regulatory and other
takings63 and concluded that police power regulations, such as zoning
and other land use restrictions, could destroy a property owner's use
and enjoyment for public benefit as easily and effectively as condemna-
tion or actual physical invasion.
64
Having concluded that a regulation could effect a taking, Justice
Brennan turned to the issue of the appropriate remedy. He rejected
both the "all" approach of the property owner, which compels the city
to buy the property, and the "nothing" approach of the city and Cali-
fornia courts, where no damages could ever be appropriate. Justice
Brennan opted for a middle ground, concluding that a regulatory tak-
ing might only be temporary. If the government chose to rescind the
regulation rather than keep it in effect and buy the property, then the
just compensation clause would be satisfied by the payment of compen-
sation for the period of time the regulation was in effect. 65
The aftermath of San Diego Gas was not difficult to predict.6 6 Lower
courts began jumping on what appeared to be a bandwagon. Seven
federal courts of appeal considered the issue, with six either expressly
or impliedly acknowledging that Justice Brennan's dissent appeared to
represent the Court's substantive views. 67 The lone holdout was the
62. Id. at 647.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 652. Justice Brennan noted that the property owner would be deprived of
the beneficial use of his property whether the government condemned the land, flooded
it or restricted it to use in its natural state. To the government, the public benefit of
such alternatives may be equally great. Id.
65. Id. at 658-59.
66. As one observer noted:
When the best, most liberal Justice of the Burger Court's San Diego panel, joined
on the substantive issue by the Court's most conservative member, derides the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court for its parochial, muddled views on takings, inverse condem-
nation and the Constitution, more is at work than a mere dissertation on private
property rights.
Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice
Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERs L.J. 15, 94-95
(1983).
67. See Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982), appealfiled, 699 F.2d 734 (1983); Hamilton Bank v. Wil-
liamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S.
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First Circuit which, because it had earlier opined that a regulation
could not require compensation,6" concluded that it would not change
its position until the pronouncement from on high was more substan-
tive than oracular.69 Like the six federal circuits, state courts began
adopting the Brennan approach. 70
The stage was set. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Hamilton Bank, observers looked forward to a conclusive decision.
After all, Hamilton Bank had been tried on the merits. Unlike Agins,
more than bare pleadings were before the Court. And unlike San Di-
ego Gas, there was no potentially undecided, potentially dispositive is-
sue remaining for trial. More importantly, the tentative solution of
San Diego Gas had been run up the flagpole and all jurisdictions, save
those that already had committed themselves to a contrary position, 1
had saluted.
THE MOUNTAIN LABORED MIGHTILY AND BROUGHT
FORTH A MOUSE
If, as in football parlance, a tie is like kissing your sister, the Hamil-
ton Bank result is more like kissing your dog. You can be grateful that
you did not get bitten, but the experience was not particularly
pleasant.72
Ct. 3108 (1985); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 398
(6th Cir. 1984), 106 U.S. 455 (1985); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476,482 n.5 (7th Cir.
1982); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985); Bank of
America v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1985); Mar-
tino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 151; In re Aircrash in Bali, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982);
Fountain v. Metro Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043 (11th Cir. 1982).
68. Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33 (Ist Cir. 1980).
69. Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31, 33 n.4 (1st Cir.
1983).
70. Pratt v. State, 309 N.W. 2d 767, 774 (Minn. 1981); Burrows v. Keene, 121 N.H.
590, 596, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981); Rippley v. Lincoln, 330 N.W. 2d 505, 510 (N.D.
1983); Anniceli v. South Kingston, 463 A.2d 135, 140 (R.I. 1983). See also Pioneer
Sand & Gravel v. Anchorage, 627 P.2d 651 (Alaska 1981) (reserving judgment on
proper remedy in light of San Diego Gas, but allowing inverse condemnation action to
go to trial).
7 1. See supra notes 68-69. See also Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz,
138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1982); Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157
Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979), a.ff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
72. Of course, Hamilton Bank and the Williamson County Regional Planning Com-
mission were involved a bit more directly than the rest of us. The Commission had a
$350,000 judgment lifted from its back and Hamilton Bank was told to jump through a
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For the third time in five years, the troops had been assembled and
the arguments exhaustively presented to the Court by counsel for the
parties and numerous amici curiae. After three arguments on the same
issue in a short period of time, the Supreme Court should have been up
to the task. Indeed, one would have thought that the Court would be
anxious to resolve this problem and remove such cases from the
crowded docket.
With a hushed expectancy, government agencies, property owners,
and environmental groups waited. Not since those three oriental kings
followed a bright star in the East had the dramatis personae so antici-
pated a birth.
And then nothing happened. Again.
Well, what did happen? And how? And why?
At bottom, of course, the Supreme Court announced that, although
it had granted certiorari ".... to address the question whether federal,
state, and local governments must pay money damages to a landowner
whose property allegedly has been 'taken' temporarily by the applica-
tion of government regulations . . ."' the answer "[o]nce again...
must be left for another day.",74
With the suspense ended early in the opinion, the Court gave two
reasons for concluding that the decision was not sufficiently final for its
consideration. First, Hamilton Bank had not obtained a "final" deci-
sion by the Planning Commission regarding development of its prop-
erty.75 After all, said the Court, whether a taking occurred depends on
the economic impact of the governmental action and the extent of its
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and such
few more hoops before filing suit and starting all over again. Actually, the Commis-
sion's insurance company prevailed in the case. The Commission was insured and
would not have paid the judgment in any event. Perhaps the fact that the appeal was
handled by the insurance company explains why the only issue raised on appeal was the
propriety of monetary damages. See infira note 77.
73. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 116.'
74. Id. One is, of course, compelled to question the Supreme Court's method of
reviewing petitions before granting review. After all, the answer to this question had
been a reason for granting review in both Agins and San Diego Gas. See San Diego Gas,
450 U.S. at 623. If the issue was not reviewable in any of these cases, the Court should
have realized it before such an extravagant use of Court and lawyer time, particularly
when some of the Justices repeatedly complain about the size of their workload. See 5
N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 158.12 at 416 n.32 (1985). Alter-
natively, if the problem was so well-hidden that it took full, plenary review to find it, it
would have been prudent for the Court to simply decide the issue.
75. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3119.
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a question can be evaluated only after the administrative agency has
reached a final position regarding its application of the regulations at
issue to the particular land in question.76 In other words, the issues
were not ripe after all. Hamilton Bank did not have a final administra-
tive determination.
This plausible sounding rationalization must have come as quite a
shock to the participants. While the logic of requiring some definitive
word from the agency hardly can be disputed, no one was in doubt as
to the Planning Commission's position."
In a nutshell, the evidence showed that in 1979, six years after ap-
proval of the preliminary plat, after the dedication of an open space
easement to the county, and after construction of the golf course and
utilities to serve the entire proposed development, the Planning Com-
mission decided to call a general halt to development and implement a
"no-growth" policy. The policy applied to projects already under con-
struction as well as to new proposals.
The Planning Commission determined that the easiest way to effec-
tuate the no-growth policy as to projects already in process was simply
to apply the new standards to them, notwithstanding agreements, ap-
provals and understandings to the contrary.
Hamilton Bank appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which
concluded that the project was entitled to be judged by 1973 standards.
The Planning Commission refused to acknowledge that decision. The
County Attorney advised Hamilton Bank that any further resort to the
Board of Zoning Appeals would be futile, as the Planning Commission
would ignore its determination. Thus, the situation facing Hamilton
Bank was that the agency which held the power of life and death over
the project decided on death.
The Supreme Court's solution? Hamilton Bank should have asked
the Planning Commission-the very entity that had decided to block
76. 105 S. Ct. at 3119.
77. This factual analysis presumes that the issue was properly before the Court. It
may not have been. Recall that the trier of fact found that the Planning Commission
was required to apply 1973 regulations to the project and that it wrongfully had refused
to do so. Not only did the Planning Commission not appeal from this portion of the
judgment (rendering it long since final), but the parties reached an agreement imple-
menting this part of the judgment while the appeal was pending. Hamilton Bank, 105
S. Ct. at 3115. Thus, on appeal the only issue was Hamilton Bank's entitlement to
damages for the period during which the Planning Commission wrongly enforced the
post-1973 regulations. All other issues were procedurally foreclosed. Cf. Donovan v.
Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977).
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the project by reneging on its agreement to evaluate the project by 1973
standards and that refused to acknowledge a determination by the
Board of Zoning Appeals to abide by its 1973 agreement-to grant a
variance from the later regulations so the project could go forward.78
The mind fairly boggles. In no other field of law does the Court
require a party to go hat in hand to the very entity that is denying its
right and ask it to please mend its ways. Indeed, the Court usually
disposes of such suggestions of futile action in brief opinions, often per
curiam, and sometimes even in footnotes.79
Government agencies will have a field day with this decision. How
does one finally ripen a case so the Supreme Court will decide it? Deci-
sions like this enable ingenious government counsel to dream up ways
to add new levels of decisionmaking to the process in an effort to pre-
vent decisions from ever appearing final.8"
Nor need one rely on the word of a property owner's advocate. In
San Diego Gas Justice Brennan exposed one game routinely employed
by government agencies trying to control the development field. The
game involves simply changing the rules until one of them works.81
78. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3118-19. The Court's conclusion that variances
also should have been sought from the Board of Zoning Appeals is difficult to fathom.
That Board already had decided that the standards to apply were the 1973 standards.
Under those standards, the preliminary plat already had been reapproved four times
between 1973 and 1979.
79. E.g., Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1969)
(discrimination by labor union against its own members); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S.
639, 640 (1968) (denying law book use to prison inmate); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
312 n.4 (1968) (denial of AFDC benefits). In each case, there was an available adminis-
trative avenue which, if pursued, theoretically could have yielded the relief sought. The
Court lost no time in explaining that there was no requirement to seek theoretically
available, but pragmatically futile, relief before filing suit. Federal trial courts consist-
ently have refused to require futile administrative action in land use cases. Sanfilippo v.
County of Santa Cruz, 415 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Kopetzke v. County
of San Mateo, 396 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372
F. Supp. 647, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Vazques, 354 F. Supp. 1358
(D.P.R. 1972); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp. 947, 949
(D.N.H. 1971); Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. Garcia Santiago, 295 F. Supp. 203, 206
(D.P.R. 1969); Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F. Supp. 664, 668 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
80. Compare Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain: A Candle in the Dark
Corner of the Law, 52 U. DET. J. URB. L. (1975). Administrative processes can con-
sume large amounts of time. Adding new layers of action only increases the delay and
damage suffered by property owners.
81. Justice Brennan cited advice given local government attorneys at the 1974 an-
nual Conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in California. As
the advice went, even if the city were to take legal preventative maintenance but still
lose a case, precedent allows the city to alter its regulations and start the process over
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Another favorite local government game has been to take the position
that when they turn down a project, they are not denying all use, but
merely the specific project proposed. Come back with another, they
say, and we will evaluate it on its merits. Just look at our zoning ordi-
nance, they say, it permits lots of (theoretical) uses. Try them on us.
One at a time .... Other agencies take the position that even rejected
plans may be re-submitted after the passage of an appropriate time pe-
riod. They thus urge that there never is a "final" rejection.
Applying Hamilton Bank to these types of government devices
means there can never be, in the Supreme Court's words, ".... a final
dccision regarding how [the property owner] will be allowed to develop
its property." 2 In addition, that is, of course, the way planning agen-
cies operate. The Supreme Court's opinion is out of touch with the real
world. Planning commissions do not make it their business to tell
property owner's specifically how they will be allowed to develop their
property."' Rather, since facial attacks on land use ordinances gener-
ally have been disallowed,84 all that can be achieved is case-by-case,
application-by-application, determinations. Only in the rarest case will
there be only one possible use, with that use then being turned down
cold."5 In general, government entities will be able to assert that other
economically viable uses are possible.86 With the Hamilton Bank pre-
again. 450 U.S. at 622 n.22 (citing Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional At-
tacks on Land Use Regulations (Including Inverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO Mu-
NICIPAL L. REV. 192-93 (1975)). See also R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING
GAME REVISITED, 1, 288 (1985).
82. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3119.
83. But cf. Spears v. Berle, 48 N.Y. 2d 254, 397 N.E. 2d 1304 (1979). In Spears the
court held that when litigating whether denial of a permit prevented all viable use, the
Commissioner of Environmental Conservation had to tell the property owner what uses
he deemed both permissible and viable. Note that this disclosure does not come about
until litigation ensues.
84. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3116-17; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260-64 (1980).
85. Such situations will, of course, arise. Hamilton Bank seems to be one.
86. See, e.g., Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 616, 179
Cal. Rptr. 73, 77 (1981). There, the property was located across the street from a run-
way at an air force base. In holding that agricultural zoning did not work a taking of
the property, the Court relied on uses theoretically permitted by the zoning ordinance.
The case was decided on the pleadings, however, with the Court never reaching the
merits. The Court ignored the complaint's allegation that the theoretically permitted
uses were a sham.
If permitted to go to trial, the sham could have been proved. For example, the fol-
lowing potential uses are unrealistic-rendering the property not economically viable-
because of the high noise levels and danger from aircraft crashes: one-family dwellings;
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cept on the books, look for such claims to multiply geometrically.
The Hamilton Bank Court added another roadblock to filing suits in
federal courts: exhaustion of state judicial remedies. According to the
Court, if the state permits an inverse condemnation action for damages
resulting from overregulation, such a suit must be filed as a precondi-
tion to a federal suit.87 A constitutional violation does not occur, rea-
soned the Court, unless a taking is effected without just compensation.
It cannot be known whether the state has countenanced such an un-
compensated taking until after resort to the state courts.88
Once again, while there is a seeming symmetry to this argument, it is
contrary to settled teachings of the Supreme Court in other contexts.
The Court long has recognized the rule that the existence of an unused
state remedy does not preclude federal court consideration of federal
constitutional violations.89
Moreover, the issue is not whether a state has countenanced the con-
stitutional violation, but whether the particular defendant has commit-
ted it. The Civil Rights Act does not bar states from maintaining
systems of jurisprudence that deny federal rights. Rather, it forbids
any person acting under color of state law from violating rights secured
by federal law. When a planning commission prohibits viable eco-
nomic use of property without any pretext of compensation, it has vio-
lated the Civil Rights Act. The presence or absence of a state remedy
has no bearing on whether the malefactor has done the deed.
In the past, the Court has rejected this concept. The Court has
found it immaterial to stating a federal claim that a person's conduct is
legal or illegal according to state law.' Such claims are entitled to be
animal hospitals, schools, kennels and veterinary offices; youth camps and other camp-
grounds; auction grounds; stock breeding facilities and stockyards; riding academies
and stables. The adverse impact of aircraft noise on animals is legendary. See, e.g.,
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (chickens); Dahlstrom v. United States,
228 F. 2d 819 (8th Cir. 1956) (horses); Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F.
Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1963) (minks); Sawyer v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 877 (M.D.
Ga. 1956) (mules). As for agricultural uses, another court already had noted the unsuit-
ability of this area for agriculture. Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. App. 3d 987,
992, 124 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1975).
87. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3121-22.
88. Id. at 3121 n.13.
89. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). See also County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 194 (1959) (state eminent domain cases routinely tried in federal
court).
90. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963).
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adjudicated in federal court.9
This theory of protecting federal rights in federal courts dates to the
founding of the United States. As James Madison bluntly put it, ...... a
review of the constitution of the courts in the many states will satisfy
us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of federal laws."9 2
The Supreme Court itself has noted that one reason for adopting the
Civil Rights Act was to provide a federal forum without recourse to
state litigation.93 The Court's analysis of the reasons for abandoning
sub silento this settled precept is less than satisfactory.
As the basis for its decision, the Court analogized Hamilton Bank to
two other types of cases: inverse condemnation cases against the fed-
eral government and Civil Rights Act cases involving random and un-
authorized torts.
The federal inverse condemnation discussion is bewildering. The
Court concludes that "... . we have held that taking claims against the
Federal Government are premature until the property owner has
availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act [that is, suit in
the United States Claims Court] . . .. 9"
The Court cannot have meant what it said. The clear implication is
that suit in the Claims Court is some kind of precondition to suit in
district court; that is, one can sue the United States for a taking in
district court, but only after resort to the Claims Court has proved
unavailing.
No statement of the law could be further from the truth. The
91. See generally IA J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.201, at 2021-22 (2d ed. 1981). Paragraph 0.201 reads in part:
The fact that state courts afford a remedy will not in itself prevent recourse to
the federal courts in cases over which they have jurisdiction. Barring exceptional
circumstances, and subject to express federal statutory restrictions, a party may
normally resort to a federal court without having first exhausted the judicial reme-
dies of the state courts.
Id.
92. Quoted in Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 836 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(1966). See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816);
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
93. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Court stated that:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal court because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intol-
erance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to
the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the 14th Amend-
ment might be denied by the state agency.
Id. at 180. See also Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-06 (1982).
94. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3121 (emphasis added).
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Claims Court is not a way station. It is the only court with jurisdiction
over inverse condemnation claims against the United States in excess of
$10,000. The Tucker Act9" provides that court with such jurisdic-
tion.96 Having jurisdiction, its ability to fashion a remedy is as com-
prehensive as the Constitution requires.97 Use of the Tucker Act is not
a prerequisite to another remedy, it is the remedy. When suit is filed in
the Claims Court, that court will decide whether a taking has occurred
and, if so, award compensation. The decision is res judicata. 98 The
case then is concluded, not shifted to a different court for another trial.
The Supreme court routinely reminds parties of the existence of the
Claims Court for this purpose.99 An inverse condemnation suit against
the United States that seeks more than $10,000 cannot be brought in a
United States district court. 1 °
While the Court's reliance on the Tucker Act is mystifying, its reli-
ance on Parratt v. Taylor °1 as the other justification for its decision
simply is misguided. In Parratt, the hobby materials of a Nebraska
Penal and Correction Complex inmate were negligently lost while in
official custody. The inmate filed an action in federal court, claiming a
violation of his civil rights. Ultimately this dispute over a $23.50
hobby kit resulted in five separate opinions by the Justices of the
Supreme Court.
Parratt's facts overwhelmed the Court. Litigation is a favorite pas-
time of those enjoying compelled vacations at government expense, and
there was simply no way the Court was going to invite every prisoner
with a nickle and dime grievance to file a Civil Rights Act case. Thus,
while the Court had no difficulty seeing a deprivation of property by a
person acting under color of state law, Mr. Taylor was remitted to the
state's tort system because of the random and unpredictable nature of
the negligence. 102 A scant year later, however, the Court in Logan v.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
96. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1980).
97. Yearsley v. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940).
98. See Garrigan v. Giese, 553 F. 2d 35 (8th Cir. 1977); Mathis v. Laird, 457 F. 2d
926 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 (1973).
99. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862-81 (1984); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-90 (1981); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 148 (1974).
100. E.g., United States v. Gregory, 300 F. 2d 11, 13 (10th Cir. 1962); 6A P. NICH-
OLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, § 29.1 at 29-7 to 29-8 (rev. 3d ed. 1981).
101. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3121-22.
102. The key for the Court was that the loss was not a result of some established
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Zimmerman Brush Co. "' announced that its Parratt conclusion would
not have been the same if the deprivation had been other than the re-
sult of random negligence."°
In Hamilton Bank, the Court did recognize the problem presented
by the juxtaposition of these two prior holdings. Specifically, it recog-
nized the imperfection of the Parratt analogy when applied to situa-
tions where property deprivation arises out of an established state
policy or procedure.10 5 Nevertheless, the Court applied Parratt, de-
spite its "imperfect[ion]," because when the deprivation is only of prop-
erty, a postdeprivation hearing supplies all the process that is due.10 6
Assuming the validity of that line of thinking,1"7 it has little applica-
tion to Hamilton Bank. The jury there found that there had been no
denial of due process and thus it was not an issue on appeal. The issue
was what compensation was due Hamilton Bank as a result of the
Planning Commission's taking of Hamilton Bank's property for two
years by a calculated course of conduct, a course of conduct that did
not cease until the district court ordered a change in its actions. The
Supreme Court's discussion makes sense only if the issue is lack of due
process, not taking without compensation.
The Supreme Court's new state remedy exhaustion requirement ap-
plies only if "procedures [are] provided by the State for obtaining such
compensation . ,,.08 If it can be shown "that the [state's] inverse
condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate. . .,"I resort to
state litigation need not be had.
For those lawyers practicing in California, this decision should have
state procedure nor one that the state could predict occurring. Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 541 (1981). Thus, because the actions were beyond the state's control, it
would be impossible to provide a meaningful predeprivation hearing. Id.
103. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
104. The Court contrasted Parratt's lack of an established state procedure with the
state system in Logan that destroyed a complainant's property interest by operation of
law. Id. at 435-36.
105. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3122. Such a situation also arose in Logan.
106. Id.
107. One must note that only government officials find this logic satisfying. The
blood of any property owner runs cold when informed that the government may do as it
pleases and the only "remedy" is to file suit and litigate the matter for years. See infra
note 126 and cases cited. The time it takes to litigate these matters too often results in
foreclosure. See supra note 13 and infra note 126 and accompanying text.
108. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3121.
109. Id. at 3122.
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little effect. California courts have clearly held that land use regula-
tions, regardless of the severity of their impact, will not subject the
regulator to inverse condemnation liability."' As Professor Williams
notes, the California Supreme Court has "read inverse condemnation
out of California jurisprudence, as a remedy for disappointed develop-
ers in land use cases.""'
Other courts, by contrast, have either acknowledged the availability
of an inverse condemnation remedy" 2 or have not spoken on the is-
sue."' Absent a definitive rejection, like California's, attempt must be
made now to recover compensation in the state courts.
COUNTING NosEs
So, where are we?
Before Hamilton Bank, we had the three opinions in San Diego Gas
for guidance. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court, joined by Jus-
tices White and Stevens and Chief Justice Burger, did not reach the
merits except to belatedly note that the issue's implication of the fed-
eral constitution is not "to be cast aside lightly."' " 4 Justice Brennan's
San Diego Gas dissent, joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stew-
art, was a ringing statement that an invalid regulation could work at
least a temporary taking that required compensation." 5 Justice Rehn-
110. See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 188
Cal. Rptr. 191 (1982). One California Court of Appeal decision that criticized Califor-
nia's noncompensation rule as being contrary to controlling precedents of the United
States Supreme Court was ordered "de-published" by the California Supreme Court. It
may be found only in unofficial reports and has no precendential effect. See Gilliland v.
City of Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr. 627, 631 (1981). Indeed, lawyers are forbidden even to
cite the case. Cal. R. of Ct. 977. Gilliland v. County of Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d
610 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 66, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25
(1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
111. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 158.12 at 412 (1985).
112. See supra notes 25-30 and cases cited.
113. Tennessee, for example, the state in which Hamilton Bank started, has not
spoken definitively yet. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's panoramic reading in
Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3122, neither Davis v. Metropolitan Gov't, 620 S.W. 2d
532 (Tenn. App. 1981), nor Speight v. Lockhart, 524 S.W. 2d 249 (Tenn. App. 1975),
holds that an inverse condemnation remedy exists. The statement in Davis was dictum,
in fact, judgment in the property owner's favor was reversed. Speight, on the other
hand, dealt with recovery of compensation for impairment of access in a direct condem-
nation case.
114. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981).
115. Id. at 652. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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quist's tantalizing concurring opinion noted that he would have "little
difficulty" agreeing with "much" of what Justice Brennan had said.
116
Justice Blackmun again penned the Court's opinion in Hamilton
Bank. Aside from constructing new procedural roadblocks, there is
nothing in Justice Blackmun's opinion that suggests that he, the Chief
Justice, who signed Justice Blackmun's Hamilton Bank opinion as
well, or Justice O'Connor, who also signed the Hamilton Bank opinion,
are yet ready to "cast aside" the serious issues presented. By their si-
lence, they leave the future open to speculation.
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, who also signed the Court's San
Diego Gas opinion, filed a separate opinion in Hamilton Bank that con-
curred only in the judgment of reversal. Unlike his brethren, Justice
Stevens now appears ready to "cast aside" the compensation issue, at
least where the taking is "only" temporary." 7 His thesis is that when
there are legitimate disputes between a citizen and his government, the
government should not be held responsible for the financial conse-
quences when it has acted unconstitutionally." 8
There are a number of things wrong with Justice Stevens' formula-
tion, not the least of which is the explicit assumption that zoning deci-
sion generally are made in good faith. As noted earlier, "9 planning
and zoning authorities often engage in game playing with the law.'
20
When one regulation is struck down, they modify it slightly and chal-
lenge the property owner to begin litigation anew.' 2 1 When a regula-
116. Id. at 633.
117. See Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3125 (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 3126-27. Justice Stevens' philosophy is that fourteenth amendment due
process only requires fair state procedures. Id. at 3127. He presumes good faith effort
by regulatory bodies, such as zoning boards, in the exercise of their official duties. Id.
As long as fair procedures are followed, injuries to private citizens should not be com-
pensable. Id.
119. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. See also 2 N. WILLIAMS,
AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 5.05 at 2 (Supp. 1985).
120. See, e.g., Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1137 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (regulatory process described as "revolving door"), affid in part, rev'd in
part, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981); Prince Georges County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 93, 407 A. 2d 1151,
1161 (Md. App. 1979) (regulatory process described as "charade"), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1083 (1981); cf. Raley v. California Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965,
984, 137 Cal. Rptr. 699, 711 (1977) (owner was "victim of maladroitly engineered envi-
ronmental controls").
121. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, supra note 81, at 288;
Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Diego, 57
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tion of one city is struck down, other cities in the same state ignore the
ruling and challenge property owners to take their particular ordi-
nances to court. Richard F. Babcock, dean of the American land use
bar, noted this problem nearly two decades ago, concluding that judi-
cially imposed injunctions have only nominal impact on local govern-
mental decision-making bodies. 22 Of course, in the two decades since
Mr. Babcock wrote, the time it takes to litigate these matters has
lengthened substantially, and the cost has increased astronomically.
If government agencies insist on pushing the law to, and past, the
brink of constitutionality, one is hard-pressed to see why they should
not pay the price when they go too far. As two commentators noted,
local government's ability to govern must be assessed skeptically, with
a tacit acknowledgment that legislative (zoning) actions may have no
legitimate purpose or simply may be based on a parochial vision that is
unduly harsh and lacks a compensating public benefit, or they merely
may be inept. 23
Thus, the assumption underlying Justice Stevens' thesis seems out of
touch with reality.124 Moreover, in 1980 the Court held that a city's
good faith is no defense in a Civil Rights Act case. 125
Finally, the idea that "temporary" harm is somehow constitutionally
acceptable buries reality under a palliative label that provides no relief.
The "temporary" time periods involved can be substantial. The two
year period of Hamilton Bank was uncommonly swift. It is not unu-
sual for property owners to be forced to cool their heels for five years
IND. L.J. 45, 51 (1982); Willemsen & Phillips, Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zoning
in California Law, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 116 (1979).
122. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 13 (1966).
123. Goldberg & Meck, Comment, 32 LAND USE L. & ZON. DIG., No. 6, at 8
(1980) (quoting I WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 110 (1974)). See also
Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 13, 52-62 (1973).
124. Compare I WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, 5.07 at 5 (Supp.
1984), in which the author suggests that the Court's half-century absence from the land
use field before 1974 has led to much confusion by the Court in general since its interest
was rekindled.
125. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980). Both the legisla-
tive purpose for enacting § 1983 and public policy mandate rejection of immunity for
good faith constitutional violations. Id. A damages remedy against the offending party
is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees,
and the importance of assuring its efficacy only is accentuated when the wrongdoer is
the institution that has been established to protect the very rights it has transgressed.
Id. at 651.
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and more. 126 Properties are lost by foreclosure during these protracted
periods during which mortgage payments and property taxes, to the
entity that is denying use, continue unabated.' 27 Often these cases in-
volve elderly property owners, who planned to live off the income from
the property during their retirement, or to see its development as their
lasting legacy. Sometimes they do not even live to see the end of the
litigation.12 "Temporary" is in the eye of the beholder.
Justice Brennan on the other hand, filed a separate concurring opin-
ion in Hamilton Bank, joined by Justice Marshall, in which he reiter-
ated his San Diego Gas views."' Justice Powell, who was ill during
part of the term, did not participate in Hamilton Bank Nonetheless,
in other cases he has repeatedly cited Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas
dissent in situations where other authority was plainly available.' 0 It is
thus probably true that Justice Powell likewise remains committed.
Justice Stewart, of course, has retired and been replaced by Justice
O'Connor, whose views are not yet in the record.
Justice Rehnquist, who filed the tantalizing concurrence in San Di-
ego Gas, did not write separately in Hamilton Bank. Thus, of the origi-
nal four dissenters, three remain on the Court and committed to their
views. The separately concurring Justice remains an enigma.
The sole remaining Justice whose position needs to be assessed is
Justice White. Justice White joined the Blackmun plurality in San Di-
ego Gas, but his contribution to Hamilton Bank merely adds to the
confusion surrounding the two cases. Justice White did nothing more
than "dissent from the holding that the issues in this case are not ripe
for decision at this time."'
131
What does that mean? Does he favor compensation or not? If he
believed the case was not only ripe, but wrongly decided by the court of
appeals, one might have expected him to note some agreement with
126. See, eg., William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F. 2d 1117 (9th
Cir. 1979) (five years), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928, reh'g. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980);
Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F. 2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (nine years); Ven-
tures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979) (seven years).
127. See supra note 13 and cases cited.
128. Eg., Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985).
129. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3124-25.
130. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 305-06
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 553 n.12 (1981) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
131. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 3124.
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Justice Stevens' analysis, but he did not. If he believed the case was not
only ripe, but correctly decided by the court of appeals, one would
have expected him to dissent from more than just the ripeness holding.
So, with the bravado of an Etruscan haruspex, the entrails of whose
sheep are still warm, one may confidently say it appears Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and probably Powell continue to believe in compensa-
tion. Justice Rehnquist has given no clue to the contrary. That is a
possible four on the compensation side. Justice Stevens has announced
himself opposed to compensation, while Justice White has obscured his
position. The balance, thus, seems to lie with the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, who have not announced any predi-
lections on the subject.
Those who like to sprinkle tea leaves over their sheep's entrails
might wish to consider the following. In Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York,' a2 Justice Rehnquist dissented and expressed
the belief that New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law effected
a taking when it compelled the owner of Grand Central Terminal to
maintain the building as an official landmark. In Dickman v. Commis-
sioner, 13 the Chief Justice, speaking for the Court in a gift tax case,
concluded that the right of property use is perhaps paramount of all
the rights associated with property interest. 1 4 Additionally, in Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Co., 13 Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court,
said that the right to make use of one's own property is constitutionally
protected.136 Justice Blackmun also reaffirmed that the proper remedy
for a taking, in that case, effected by a regulation, was compensation to
the owner, not invalidation of the regulation.3 7 As 1985 drew to a
close, a unanimous Court led by Justice White reaffirmed the Ruckel-
shaus decision that compensation, not invalidation, is the appropriate
remedy for a regulatory taking of property. 31
At this writing, all one can do is speculate. But the amount of grist
for such speculation is increasing.
132. 438 U.S. 104, 140-44 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. 465 U.S. 330, reh)g. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1932 (1984).
134. 465 U.S. at 336, 104 S. Ct. at 1090.
135. 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984).
136. Id. at 2878.
137. Id. at 2880.
138. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 106 U.S. 455 (1985).
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CONCLUSION
One could take the position that this is all black comedy; that law-
yers should smile as they continue to litigate these cases and charge
clients for their efforts. But the problem is far too serious for that. Too
many people are being victimized simply because the law is unclear.
To allow the law to remain so is scandalous when the solution is so
simple. One of these cases needs deciding. If not Agins, nor San Diego
Gas nor Hamilton Bank, then surely something else is in the pipeline
that can provide an appropriate vehicle. This issue has been allowed to
fester far too long. The time has come for the Supreme Court to give a
definitive answer so that local government agencies and all who deal
with them can make decisions based on firm knowledge of the conse-
quences rather than rolling the dice each time. As this article goes to
press, the Supreme Court announced its intention to consider the regu-
latory issue again. The Court has noted probable jurisidction in Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo. 139 The troops are being
roused to battle again. Stay tuned. We may have an answer yet.
139. 106 U.S. 244 (1985).
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